We identify a mistake in the speci…cation of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen et al. (2007) , whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a pro…t comparison with the alternative delegation scheme à la Fershtman and Judd (1987) .
Introduction
In a recent paper, Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2007, JLW henceforth) investigate the properties of Cournot and Bertrand behaviour in a strategic delegation model where contracts instruct managers to maximise a combination of pro…ts and market shares. 1 In this note, we single out a mistake in the speci…cation of the market demand functions, that in JLW are modelled in such a way that the resulting prices do not collapse to marginal cost under full product substitutability. To amend this aspect, we properly de…ne demands and work out the Bertrand case anew, and then proceed to compare the performance of …rms against the alternative delegation scheme adopted by Fershtman and Judd (1987) .
The model
Consider a di¤erentiated duopoly where symmetric …rms share the same marginal and average production cost c 2 [0; 1) : JLW set out to sketch the price competition case by adopting the demand system 
requiring
whereby the candidate symmetric equilibrium price is p = (1 + c) = (1 + ) ;
and the resulting per-…rm output and pro…ts are q = (1 c) = (1 + ) and
Now, if were indeed a direct measure of product di¤erentiation, one should observe both price and pro…ts monotonically increasing in ; while instead the opposite applies:
and imposing @ =@ > 0 would in turn imply q < 0:
Moreover, under full substitutability, marginal cost pricing with zero profits should of course emerge, while setting = 0 yields p = 1 + c > c and = 1: Also, note that 1 + c > (1 + c) =2; which implies that this model yields a duopoly price with homogeneous goods higher than full monopoly price.
2
The source of this issue is to be found in a mistaken normalization. This becomes apparent as soon as one, instead of (1), adopts the demand system dating back to Bowley (1924) and then revived by Spence (1976) , Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984) , inter alia:
where a > c, b > 0 and s 2 ( b; b); with parameter s measuring the degree of substitutability (in the positive range) or complementarity (in the negative range) between goods. One can indeed de…ne
but then the simultaneous normalization of a= (1 + s) and b= (1 s 2 ) to one is altogether inadmissible, as a= (1 + s) 6 = b= (1 s 2 ), and incompatible with (6).
Accordingly, in the remainder we will use (5), posing a = b = 1 for the sake of simplicity. Now we proceed to the analysis of the two-stage duopoly game between managerial …rms in the market share case.
The manager of …rm i is assigned the following objective function:
where w i is the delegation variable to be chosen by the owner at the …rst stage. The …rst order conditions (FOC) at the market stage for i = 1; 2 are
and solving this system would yield the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices in the form p 
To obtain the partial derivatives
, we di¤erentiate the FOC (8) with respect to w i and w j taking into account that p i = p i (w i ; w j ). The resulting linear system can be simply written as 2 6 6 4
Applying Cramer's rule, the solutions can now be obtained as Inserting these expressions into (9) yields an additional condition which has to hold in equilibrium. If we now exploit the ex ante symmetry of the model and set p i = p j = p and w i = w j = w, from (8) we obtain
Inserting this expression into the condition (9) and assuming symmetry, we obtain a quadratic polynomial with solutions
We have
so that we take p as the only reasonable candidate equilibrium price. This is con…rmed by looking at the corresponding individual output levels:
with
A de…nitive element in favour of p is the stability analysis based on the determinant of the Jacobian matrix in the price space, revealing that
whereby the solution p is stable while the other is not.
Now that we have obtained the correct solutions to the price-setting delegation game for the market share case, we may move on to compare the equilibrium price p obtained above with that characterising the incentive scheme used by Fershtman and Judd (1987, FJ henceforth) . In the FJ case the objective of manager i is
R i = p i q i being the …rm's revenues. We stick to our previous normalisation,
From the FOCs in the price space one obtains
Then, pro…t maximization at the …rst stage requires
so that (17) simpli…es as follows:
which of course belongs to the interval [c; (1 + c) =2] for all s 2 [0; 1] : At this point a numerical excercise su¢ ces to check that p F J < p and consequently also that pro…ts are lower under the FJ delegation scheme than under market share-based contracts for all s 2 (0; 1). To sum up, this con…rms the qualitative conclusion attained by JLW in comparatively assessing the market share-based incentive scheme against that of FJ.
Conclusion
In this note, we have shown that Jansen et al. (2007) use a misspeci…ed demand system, and we have corrected their mistake. We have then derived the correct solution and compared it with the delegation game based on sales revenue which has been originally studied in Fershtman and Judd (1987) .
This has allowed us to point out that using contracts based on market share indeed makes competition softer and results in higher pro…ts.
